

THE CONVERGENCE  
*of* LINCOLN *and*  
DOUGLAS

By

*William O. Lynch,*  
*Professor of History, Indiana University*

Reprinted from the Transactions of the Illinois State  
Historical Society, 1925.

(Printed by authority of the State of Illinois.)





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*Compliments of the writer,  
Wm. O. Lynch.*

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## THE CONVERGENCE OF LINCOLN AND DOUGLAS

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In the last speech of his career, which was read to the Senate by a friend, Calhoun declared that the strongest cord of a political nature that bound the two sections together consisted of the many ties existing between the northern and southern elements of the Whig and Democratic Parties. "Both", he asserted, "extended to every part of the Union, and strongly contributed to hold all its parts together." The discouraged old statesman then pointed out that the powerful cord furnished by the organized, nation-wide parties was snapping, as other cords had already done, under the strain of sectional agitation.<sup>1</sup> Though recognizing the gravity of the situation portrayed by the dying Calhoun, the Union-savers of 1850, after carrying the Compromise measures, believed that they had prevented the severance of the political bonds that united the North and South.

By 1860, however, the situation had become more strained than in 1850. In the campaign of 1860, there were four candidates for the presidency, not one of whom was backed by a nation-wide party. A study of the election returns reveals that Bell and Breckinridge ran almost even in the slaveholding States, with an almost negligible support in the North. Lincoln and Douglas were northern candidates. Douglas carried Missouri by a slight plurality over Bell, but in all the remaining slave-holding States his aggregate vote was but little larger than that received in Missouri alone. In no other southern State did his vote amount to half that received by either Breckinridge or Bell, while in the entire South he received an aggregate vote that was less than a third of that of either of the southern candidates. Lincoln received over 17,000 votes in Missouri, and but few over half that number in all the remaining States of the South.<sup>2</sup>

Of the four parties, two were southern while the other two were northern. The assumption that the Constitutional Union party was made up of strong unionist voters is largely errone-

<sup>1</sup> Cong. Globe, 31 Cong., 1 sess., Part I, pp. 451-543. Senate, March 4, 1850.

<sup>2</sup> The total vote for Bell in the slaveholding States was 515,973; that for Breckinridge was 571,051. The total vote for Bell in the non-slaveholding States was 72,906; that for Breckinridge was 278,750. It should be kept in mind that 178,871 votes were cast for Breckinridge electors in Pennsylvania alone. This vote, the result of a fusion arrangement between the Northern Democratic party and the Southern Democratic party, greatly exaggerates the real strength of Breckinridge in that State, while it disguises the strength of Douglas, who, on the face of the returns, received only the support of the 16-765 Douglas Democrats who refused to accept fusion.



ous. The term **Union** in the party name has been too strongly stressed, while the term **Constitutional** has been too lightly noticed. This party included the greater portion of the Whig party of the South plus a remnant of the same party of the North. It stood for a Union based on the Constitution as it was made by the "fathers". It was a party supporting the full constitutional rights of slaveholders, and it refused to take an open position on the question of slavery in the territories, because, in the nature of the case, it could not do so and maintain its existence.<sup>3</sup>

In truth we had in 1860 two elections, one in the South and one in the North. The Union was no longer bound together by nation-wide parties. This cord had finally "snapped", and the situation which Calhoun believed to be at hand a decade earlier had actually developed. The North would support Bell no more than it would support Breckinridge. The South would support neither Lincoln nor Douglas. A friend of Douglas, living in the moderate State of North Carolina, wrote to an Indiana leader: "There is no man in America, I think, who had more popularity in this State than Senator Douglas prior to his difference of opinion with Mr. Buchanan on the admission of Kansas with the Lecompton Constitution. Since that time however he has been the especial object of misrepresentation, calumny and vituperation. His warmest and best friends . . . are assailing and denouncing him. In fact thousands of people in North Carolina who once held him in the highest veneration, as the author of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, and the abrogation of the Missouri restriction [now regard him] as the blackest black Republican in the Confederacy."<sup>4</sup>

Had not each section, since the days of Jackson, been so thoroughly divided along party lines, the coming war could have been more easily foreseen. The Whig and Democratic parties had both been nation-wide parties. Each had been strong in both North and South. There was no "solid South" in the ante-bellum period. In fact, the South was a far better friend of the Whig party after 1840 than was the North.<sup>5</sup> By 1860, however, the Republican party, a thoroughly sectional party, had become not only much stronger in numbers than the Whig party had ever been in

<sup>3</sup> As a matter of fact the decision which southern citizens made in 1861 was a far more fundamental test than the decision of 1860. Party ties and party traditions determined how most southerners should vote in 1860, but when it was necessary to decide between the Union and the Confederacy, party ties were not so effective as the varying social and economic conditions of the different geographic areas. Party lines did not hold in 1861. Arthur C. Cole, *The Whig Party in the South* (Washington, 1913), chap. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Captain J. L. DeCartaret to John G. Davis (Raleigh, North Carolina), Jan. 11, 1860, in unpublished correspondence of John G. Davis. Davis was a member of Congress from a district of western Indiana. He was a staunch supporter of Douglas both before and after the Lecompton controversy.

<sup>5</sup> From 1836 to 1848, inclusive, the Whig and Democratic parties were of about equal strength in the South. In 1844, it was not the South but the North that defeated Clay. In 1848, the South and East, without the aid of a single State of the Northwest, elected Taylor. In 1852, there was a Democratic land-slide in both North and South. After 1852, the bulk of the Whig party in the South, uniting with a small remnant of the party in the North, continued a separate existence to the Civil War, under new party names. In 1860, the Constitutional Union party polled almost as great a vote in the slaveholding States as did the Southern Democratic party. (See note 2 above).



the North, but also much more effectively organized. This was partly because many able and aggressive Democratic leaders had entered the party and contributed their skill in organization and management. In the matter of voting power, though the larger portion of the Republican party had come from the Whig party, it had won the allegiance of a great element from the ranks of the Democratic party.<sup>6</sup>

In the northern States, after 1854, and more especially in the western arena, the Democratic party faced a much keener competition for the elective offices than had been the case in the Whig period. This situation caused the Democratic and Republican leaders of the time to exaggerate their differences, while they failed to recognize the fundamental fact that mighty forces were at work eliminating the importance of party contracts within the North. At the same time a similar development was taking place within the South.

Interpreters of American political history overcome by the strenuous competition that prevailed between the northern parties following the birth of the Republican party, have, like the leaders of the time, over-stressed the importance of the con-

<sup>6</sup> Anyone familiar with the party history of the United States can name a long list of prominent northern Democrats who took their places among the leaders of the Republican party between its origin and the election of Lincoln, and many others who became Union party men during the Civil War. The approximate number of Democrats that helped to make up the rank and file of the new party can be determined by a comparative study of the popular vote cast in northern States in 1852 with the vote cast in 1856 or in 1860. The table given below is based on a comparison of the vote of 1852 with that of 1856. The method used may be illustrated by the case of New York. In that State the total vote of 1856 shows an increase of 14.2 per cent. Had nothing occurred between 1852 and 1856 to produce a re-alignment of voters, each of the parties should have received its proportional part of the total increase. Assuming that only Whigs voted for Fillmore in 1856, and that no Whigs voted for Buchanan (neither assumption being accurate, of course), we arrive at the results indicated. If Whigs voted for Buchanan in greater numbers than Democrats voted for Fillmore in 1856, which was probably the case, then figures showing the number of Democrats voting for Fremont are too low. It should, of course, be remembered that many Whigs voted the Democratic ticket in 1852.

Composition of Republican vote in 1856.

Selected States	Total Republican vote in 1856	Democrats voting Republican ticket	Whigs voting Republican ticket	Free Soilers vot- ing Republican ticket
New York	276,007	103,435	143,644	28,927
Massachusetts	108,190	19,672	60,825	39,240
Pennsylvania	147,510	5,995	131,344	10,161
Ohio	187,497	14,179	138,671	34,646
Indiana	94,375	4,360	81,063	8,592
Illinois	96,189	18,520	62,352	15,316
Non-Slave-Hold- ing States	1,339,718	239,135	900,990	199,593



flict over the party issues of the period. To such an extent has the rivalry between Lincoln and Douglas been emphasized that it has been possible to explain the stand of Douglas after the firing on Fort Sumter, though commended in the highest terms, only as an eleventh hour display of courage and statesmanship. There is something so unjust and misleading about all this that the time seems ripe for the challenging of some of the assumptions that lie back of the usual presentation of the relations between the two great leaders of Illinois whose political careers were so closely interwoven. The debates of 1858 did not reveal the two men as poles apart, but left them nearer together instead of widening the already shortened space between them. The greatest truth about them is that their paths converged. When, in the end, they stood on common ground it was because Lincoln had swerved as much toward Douglas as had Douglas toward Lincoln.

For the period of his career coming before the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Douglas has suffered little at the hands of Lincoln biographers or writers of American political history. In these earlier years he was an aggressive and successful Democratic leader. Few men in American history have advanced more rapidly to power and influence. On the other hand, Lincoln did not achieve much success outside of Illinois. This was largely because he was a Whig in a State that was reliably Democratic, though the margin of victory was sometimes small.<sup>7</sup> There were few party prizes for Whigs in Illinois, and those few were desired by many. In the congressional district that included Sangamon county (the seventh district from 1843 to 1852), a Whig area, the competition between the Whig Leaders was so keen that for several years no representative from the district was permitted to secure a second nomination.<sup>8</sup>

Elected to Congress in 1846, during the opening period of the Mexican War, Lincoln fell in with his party in opposition to the war policy of the Polk administration. He introduced resolutions on December 22, 1847, controverting the claim of the President, made prior to the declaration of war, that "Mexicans had shed the blood of our fellow citizens on our own soil."<sup>9</sup> On January 12, 1848, Lincoln defended these "spot resolutions" (since made famous by his biographers), in a brief speech.<sup>10</sup> By this

<sup>7</sup> Results of presidential contests in Illinois during the Whig period:

1836—Van Buren, 18,459; White or Harrison, 15,240.

1840—Van Buren, 47,443; Harrison, 45,576; Birney, 160.

1844—Polk, 58,982; Clay, 45,931; Birney, 3,433.

1848—Cass, 56,300; Taylor, 53,047; Van Buren, 15,774.

1852—Pierce, 80,597; Scott, 64,934; Hale, 9,966.

<sup>8</sup> The first election in the newly created seventh congressional district occurred in August, 1843, when John J. Hardin was the Whig candidate. In August, 1844, the Whig candidate was Edward D. Baker; in August, 1846, Abraham Lincoln; and in August, 1848, Stephen T. Logan. The first three were elected, but Logan was defeated, the probable fate of Lincoln, had he been renominated.

<sup>9</sup> *Cong. Globe*, 30 cong., 1 sess., p. 64.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 30 cong., 1 sess., pp. 154-156.



time the war was nearly over and Lincoln, in harmony with his party, soon deserted the war issue. Though no doubt sincere in his opposition to the policy of the Polk administration in bringing on the war, the question certainly did not long rest heavily on the mind of the Whig leader from Springfield. He quickly became absorbed in the coming presidential contest. He was an enthusiastic advocate of the nomination of General Taylor, and his warm supporter during the campaign.<sup>11</sup> He made speeches in New England after the adjournment of Congress and later in Illinois.<sup>12</sup>

The triumph of Taylor was gratifying to Lincoln, and he desired to see the incoming administration a success. He was also hopeful that he might be rewarded with an appointive office of some importance.<sup>13</sup> These facts probably account, in part, for the calm manner in which he sat through the exciting discussions involving the slavery question that occurred in the House during the short session of 1848-1849. A careful study of the pages of the *Congressional Globe* for that stormy session leads one to believe that Lincoln was not in harmony with the strong anti-slavery sentiments voiced by so many of his colleagues, both Democratic and Whig. Though twenty-two of the twenty-seven Democratic members who were present from the Northwest voted for the resolution of Daniel Gott concerning the abolition of the slave-trade in the District of Columbia, Lincoln voted against it.<sup>14</sup> The preamble of the resolution strongly arraigned the traffic in slaves and was offensive to southern Whigs and Democrats. At this time, Lincoln certainly maintained a conservative position. That he was satisfied to remain a member of a nationwide party knowing no North and no South, is attested by the fact that he was not attracted to the Liberty party in 1844, nor to the Free Soil party in 1848, and further, by the fact that he remained a Whig in 1852, accepting the "finality plank" in good faith.<sup>15</sup>

There is no more question of the loyalty of Lincoln to the Whig party during the whole period of its existence in the North than there is of the loyalty of Douglas to the Democratic party during the same period. Both were good party men. Both were most sincerely attached to the Union. Both were moderate men

<sup>11</sup> Lincoln to E. B. Washburne (Washington), April 30, 1848, in *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, edited by John G. Nicolay and John Hay (New York, 1894), I, p. 118; Lincoln to Archibald Williams (Washington), April 30, 1848, in *ibid.*, I, p. 118; Lincoln to Williams (Washington), June 12, 1848, in *ibid.*, p. 122; Lincoln to William H. Herndon (Washington), June 22, 1848, in *ibid.*, I, p. 131.

<sup>12</sup> William H. Herndon and Jesse W. Weik, *Abraham Lincoln, The True Story of a Great Life* (New York, 1892), I, chap. 10.

<sup>13</sup> Lincoln to W. B. Warren and others (Springfield), April 7, 1849, in *Complete Works*, I, p. 103; Lincoln to J. M. Lucas (Springfield), April 12, 1849, in *ibid.*, I, p. 155; Lincoln to E. Embree (Springfield), May 25, 1849, in *ibid.*, I, p. 157; Lincoln to Nathaniel Pope (Springfield), June 8, 1849, in *ibid.*, p. 158.

<sup>14</sup> *Cong. Globe*, 30 cong., 1 sess., p. 84.

<sup>15</sup> Herndon and Weik, *op. cit.*, Chap. 10; Ida M. Tarbell, *The Life of Abraham Lincoln* (New York, 1900), II, appendix, pp. 296-299, report of speech of Lincoln at Worcester, Mass., Sept. 12, 1848; *Complete Works*, I, p. 184. Speech at Peoria, Oct. 16, 1854.



in regard to sectional questions, believing it wise to prevent conflict between the northern and southern wings of their respective parties. The party of each had its pro-slavery element, its anti-slavery element, and its moderate element. Furthermore, these two great parties were competitors for the same position, each seeking to remain a nation-wide party knowing no North and no South. It was hard for the leaders of either party to believe failure possible in regard to this maintenance of a country-wide unity, though both did fail in the end, the Whig party first.<sup>16</sup>

In the triumph of 1840, the Whigs showed a real party strength in both the South and the North. The slight defeat of the Whigs in 1844, followed by the annexation of Texas and the Mexican War, seemed to place the Democrats in a position of vantage. Nevertheless, though General Cass was condemned throughout the North for having surrendered to "southern dictation", the Whigs won the South in 1848.<sup>17</sup> Circumstances were such that the Whig party carried out no program of party legislation during the Taylor-Fillmore administration. There was no new swing back toward protection, no second abolition of the independent treasury system, no chartering of a new Bank of the United States, and no distribution of the proceeds of the sales of public lands. Instead, the crisis of 1850 resulted in the famous compromise measures, a co-operative achievement of Whig and Democratic Union-savers.

In 1852, both parties declared for the finality of the healing acts of 1850. It has been many times asserted that the Whig party died because of its acceptance of the fugitive slave law. If this be true, it should be explained why it was the Whig rather than the Democratic party that suffered death. There is really little to support this time-worn explanation of the Democratic land-slide of 1852. The Democrats had a candidate whom no element of the party opposed. The Whig candidate was not very satisfactory to either the northern or southern Whigs. The party should have nominated President Fillmore, as truly an ideal candidate for the Whigs of that day as was President Coolidge for the Republicans in 1924. It does not seem that the election really turned on the strength of the rival candidates. Perhaps the real reason for the overwhelming defeat of the Whigs was

<sup>16</sup> The Whig party never had a chance to wage another presidential contest after 1852, but writers on American party history in the entire period since 1854 have been too sure that the Whig party had been moving toward certain dissolution during its later years, and that its weakness should have been apparent to any observer of party conditions after 1848. The writer of this paper does not agree with this view. On the contrary he believes that it was a "toss-up" between 1848 and 1852 as to which of the two great parties would be able to remain a nation-wide party and which one would become a northern and sectional party, or furnish the larger portion of the voters for a new sectional party. See William O. Lynch, "Anti-Slavery Tendencies of the Democratic Party in the Northwest from the Election of General Taylor to the Crisis of 1850", in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, Dec., 1924.

<sup>17</sup> In 1848, the Whigs carried all the slaveholding States that they had carried in 1844 (Delaware, Kentucky, Tennessee, Maryland, North Carolina) plus Louisiana, Georgia and the new State of Florida.



that, with questions relating to slavery largely eliminated both as to platforms and candidates, voters of independent tendencies, North, South, East and West, had a real opportunity to pass judgment on the two parties. Such being the case the decision was made in favor of the party standing for a low tariff, the champion of the independent treasury system, and the party that had everywhere stood for the extension of self-government in State constitutions and State Laws.<sup>18</sup>

It is clear that the Whig and Democratic parties, whatever may have been true of certain individuals or communities, were not antagonistic on the great questions pertaining to the status of slavery under the Federal Constitution. It is equally plain that both were determined to preserve the Union. Until 1854, it can be maintained that there was no rivalry between Lincoln and Douglas on these great issues. Neither was ready to support policies hostile to the South, and both were opposed to sectional parties.

It was the Kansas-Nebraska Act that first brought these Illinois leaders into conflict over the slavery question. It has been established in recent years that Douglas did not provide for two Territories instead of one in order to give the South a chance to make a slaveholding State of one of them, but in order to eliminate the controversy relating to the location of the route for the Pacific railway from the territorial question. Furthermore, there is good reason for believing that he did not plan to supersede the Missouri Compromise restriction nor consent to its repeal for the purpose of furthering his own political fortunes, but that he accepted the one expedient and then the other because necessary to secure the passage of his measure.<sup>19</sup> Having earlier accepted the principle of popular sovereignty, and having become its champion in regard to the Territories of Kansas and Nebraska, he more and more strongly believed it to be a fair policy for North and South alike, a democratic and just method of disposing of the slavery question in the Territories.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Many things, of course, entered into the defeat of the Whigs. The Southern Whigs were not satisfied with General Scott. The Democratic candidate was a man toward whom no element of the party was hostile. It has been claimed that the northern Whigs were dissatisfied with the finality plank of the platform, and that this wrecked the party in the North, but if so why did the dissatisfied northern whigs vote the Democratic ticket rather than the Free Soil ticket? The only explanation that seems to explain is that with the slavery issue practically eliminated, the country preferred the Democratic party on its record.

<sup>19</sup> Frank H. Hodder, "The Genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska Act," in *State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Proceedings*, 1912, pp. 69-86; Hodder, "The Railroad Background of the Kansas-Nebraska Act", in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, June, 1925, pp. 3-22; Allen Johnson, *Stephen A. Douglas* (New York, 1908), Chap. II; Frank E. Stevens, *Life of Stephen A. Douglas*, *Journal of Illinois Historical Society*, October, 1923, January, 1924, pp. 460-469.

<sup>20</sup> Douglas had become a staunch friend of the principle of popular sovereignty long before he dreamed of applying the principle to the Nebraska country. However, reluctantly he may have accepted the idea of repealing the Missouri Compromise, the closing passage of his defense of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill on the night of its passage by the Senate shows that his vision of the wisdom and fairness of the principle had already taken possession of him. He did not foresee the consequences of the measure—the struggle that took place on the soil of Kansas, the origin and growth of the Republican party, the bitter debates in Congress, the Lecompton contest—all of which were to affect his political fortunes so vitally. At no time, however, was he turned from his course, but remained to the last a defender of

Against the policy of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, a large portion of the northern people took a most vigorous stand. A new party sprang into existence, whose leading principle was the prohibition of slavery in all the Territories by Congressional enactments. Lincoln arrayed himself with the anti-Nebraska forces, and after a time became one of the leaders of the new Republican party. Douglas found that he had become the most conspicuous political leader of the country, bitterly denounced by his northern critics, but popular in the South for a period.

The passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act not only produced a new and strong party but also a struggle in and over Kansas. The more turmoil in the Territory, and the more agitation it produced in the country at large and in Congress, the easier it was for Republican editors and speakers to make converts. The greater portion of northern Whigs became Republicans, while a lesser element in conjunction with most of the southern Whigs formed first the American party and later the Constitutional Union party. In 1856, the American party could not command the full strength of the Whigs in the South. This helped Buchanan to win in the election, though the majority of the total vote cast in the non-slaveholding States was decidedly against him.<sup>21</sup>

Whig leaders of the North who became Republicans generally increased greatly thereby their chances for success as party leaders in many of the States. It was often true, however, that the Democrats who had joined the new party were able to wield the balance of power, and for this reason shrewd and able anti-Nebraska Democrats were frequently successful in securing offices. A striking example is the election of Lyman Trumbull, the anti-Nebraska Democrat, and not Lincoln, the anti-Nebraska Whig, to the United States Senate by the general assembly of Illinois in 1855.<sup>22</sup>

Another opportunity came to Lincoln in 1858, when he was named by the Republican State convention as the man who should succeed Douglas, providing the new party should secure control of the Legislature. The situation had greatly changed since the elections of 1854 and 1856 in respect to Kansas, and indeed as related to the whole question of slavery in the Territories. The disturbed party condition was made more complex by the Dred Scott Decision of 1857. The Lecompton contest had just taken place, from which Douglas had emerged once more

and a believer in his principle. See William O. Lynch, "The Character and Leadership of Stephen A. Douglas", in Mississippi Valley Historical Association, *proceedings*, 1920-1921, pp. 454-467.

<sup>21</sup> Of the non-slaveholding States, Buchanan secured the electoral votes of New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, and California, a total of 62. Fremont received a total of 114, while Fillmore carried no free State. The total popular vote in the non-slaveholding States was divided as follows: Fremont, 1,339,718; Buchanan, 1,222,750; Fillmore, 393,590.

<sup>22</sup> Letter to E. B. Washburne (Springfield), February 9, 1855, in *Complete Works of Lincoln*, I, pp. 213-215. This letter gives a clear and accurate account of the election of Trumbull to the Senate.



the most conspicuous party leader of the country. This time he received praise from northern leaders who had most severely condemned him four years earlier, while his popularity in the South vanished. On August 2, 1858, after the canvass had begun in Illinois, but prior to the first of the joint debates between Lincoln and Douglas, the citizens of Kansas Territory voted under the terms of the English Compromise, the result being an overwhelming victory for the free-State cause.<sup>23</sup>

The outcome of this election meant that under the operation of the principle of popular sovereignty, slavery was not to be established in Kansas. When it is noted that in no other Territory then belonging to the United States, was there so good a chance for slaves to be successfully used as that furnished by Kansas, it can be seen that there was little reason for further conflict between Republicans and Douglas Democrats. When we add to this the fact that Douglas had caused the failure of the attempt to bring Kansas into the Union under the Lecompton Constitution, at the cost of a break with President Buchanan, and the loss of the friendship of the South, any fair-minded student of the situation should recognize that the senatorial campaign of 1858 in Illinois was by no means a contest between an ardent anti-slavery leader and a champion of slaveholders.

There were many mild anti-slavery Democrats in the State who might be won by either candidate. There were many former Whigs who had not yet become Republicans, who might be drawn into either camp. Douglas was under great temptation to represent Lincoln as having become an abolitionist, in order to turn these groups against him. Lincoln was under equal temptation to ignore certain significant facts and to present Douglas to the voters as the friend of slavery, that he might draw the wavering groups into the Republican party where so many voters of similar antecedents and sentiments were already lined up for battle.<sup>24</sup> Both leaders succumbed to the temptation to a considerable degree. Neither did anything like justice to the other. This constitutes the weakness of the debates. On the other hand, each so successfully maintained his true position when on the defensive, that the conclusion of the canvass found them closer together than they were at the beginning.

In the "House Divided" speech, Lincoln furnished a basis for

<sup>23</sup> The great victory of the anti-Lecompton forces in this election in Kansas Territory, coming just when it did, was undoubtedly an aid to Douglas, who called attention to the "nearly ten to one" decision of the people of the Territory. (*Complete Works of Lincoln*, I, p. 346. Opening Speech at Jonesboro.) Lincoln must have understood that the event was exerting an influence against him for he argued that the decision against the Lecompton Constitution had settled little. (*Ibid.*, I, pp. 407-408. Rejoinder at Charleston.)

<sup>24</sup> Though the wavering voters of the pivotal counties of central Illinois did not swing to the Republican candidates for the General Assembly in 1858, their refusal meaning a victory for Douglas, they did join the Republican ranks in 1860, giving victory to the national and State tickets of that party in Illinois. It is probably true that many Democrats, who still favored Douglas over Lincoln, voted for Lincoln in 1860 because they believed that Douglas could not be elected. Being angered over the repudiation of Douglas by the South and over the fusion arrangement in Pennsylvania, they voted for Lincoln to make sure of the defeat of Breckinridge.

the contention of Douglas that he had become more extreme in his opposition to slavery. When in the course of the debates, Lincoln had made his meaning clear there was not much of radicalism left in his assertion that the nation could "not endure permanently half slave and half free." His contention was that if slavery should be kept out of the new Territories and confined to the States where it already existed, agitation would cease, but not otherwise, because the public mind would then rest in the belief that slavery would ultimately become extinct. When speaking to the Charleston assemblage, he added: "I do not mean that when it takes a turn toward ultimate extinction it will be in a day nor in a year, nor in two years. I do not suppose that in the most peaceful way ultimate extinction would occur in less than a hundred years at least; but that it will occur in the best way in God's own good time, I have no doubt."<sup>25</sup> Having qualified his "house divided" doctrine by this important amendment, Lincoln placed himself a long way from the abolitionists, leaving no very wide gulf between himself and Douglas.

When attacking the opinion of Chief Justice Taney for denying the right of a negro to become a citizen of the United States, Lincoln frequently referred to the Declaration of Independence. His utterances in this connection seemed to show a strong trend toward abolitionism. In his speech at Chicago, made prior to the debates he voiced this plea: "Let us discard this quibbling about this man or the other man; this race and that race and the other race being inferior, and therefore must be placed in an inferior position. . . . Let us discard all these things and unite as one people throughout this land, until we shall once more stand up declaring that all men are created equal. . . . I leave you, hoping that the lamp of liberty will burn in your bosom until there shall no longer be a doubt that all men are created free and equal."<sup>26</sup> Before we are able to judge of the real position of Lincoln, however, we must place alongside the above other statements made just as frequently and perhaps more deliberately. At Charleston, he prefaced his opening address with the following: "I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races, that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position

<sup>25</sup> *Complete Works*, I, p. 408. This statement was made by Lincoln in his half-hour rejoinder speech at Charleston, Sept. 18, 1858.

<sup>26</sup> *Complete Works*, I, p. 260. Speech at Chicago, July 10, 1858.



of superior and inferior, and I as much as any man am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race. I say upon this occasion I do not perceive that because the white man is to have the superior position the negro should be denied everything."<sup>27</sup> On another occasion, Lincoln stated that he did not believe that the power to alter the social and political relations of the negro and the white man was lodged in Congress, but that this power could only be exercised by the State legislature.<sup>28</sup>

On the negro question, Douglas was very frank in the expression of his beliefs. He held that the negro was not and ought not to become a citizen of the United States. He did not think that States ought to make voters of negroes, but admitted that they possessed the right to make them voters and to qualify them for office.<sup>29</sup> At Alton he said: "I hold that this government was established on the white basis. It was established by white men for the benefit of white men and their posterity forever, and should be administered by white men and none others. But it does not follow, by any means, that merely because the negro is not a citizen, that therefore he should be a slave. On the contrary, it does follow that we ought to extend to the negro race, and to all other dependent races, all the rights, all the privileges, all the immunities which they can exercise consistently with the safety of society. Humanity requires that we should give them all those privileges. Christianity commands that we should extend those privileges to them. The question then arises, what are those privileges, and what is the nature and extent of them? My answer is that that is a question which each State must answer for itself. We of Illinois have decided it for ourselves. We tried slavery, kept it up for twelve years, and finding that it was not profitable, we abolished it for that reason and became a free State. We adopted in its stead the policy that a negro in this State shall not be a slave and shall not be a citizen. We have a right to adopt that policy. For my part, I think it a wise and sound policy for us."<sup>30</sup>

Like Lincoln, Douglas qualified his more vigorous utterances. When the qualifications made by each are studied, as fully as their more extreme statements, as they should be, the divergence is not very startling. In fact both men were satisfied with the existing status of free negroes in Illinois, both admitted the right of other States to deal with free negroes as they might desire, and neither would interfere with slavery in the States where it already existed. They advocated different policies in regard to slavery in the Territories, but popular sovereignty had already made Kansas free, and it would surely produce the same

<sup>27</sup> *Complete Works*, I, pp. 369-370. Opening speech at Charleston.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 406. Rejoinder speech at Charleston.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 343-345. Opening speech at Jonesboro.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 495-496. Opening speech at Alton. In other speeches, he asserted the same view.

result in every other existing Territory. The application of the Wilmot Proviso principle could do no more.

Lincoln was obliged to combat the Dred Scott Decision, because it antagonized the Wilmot proviso principle, the foundation principle of the Republican party. He firmly believed that it also played havoc with the principle of popular sovereignty, though Douglas claimed that he, unlike the Republicans, had no war to make on the decisions of the Supreme Court.<sup>31</sup> Technically, the Court had not defined the rights of a territorial legislature, though it had denied the right of Congress to prohibit slavery in a Territory. Lincoln contended that the question of the power of a Territorial legislature had been in reality decided since the Court could not deny to Congress a power and then permit its creature, a Territorial legislature, to exercise that power. Douglas did not combat this view, but argued with sound logic that slavery could not exist anywhere unless supported by local "police regulations", which a hostile legislature could refuse to provide. He also asserted that if the people were hostile to slavery, they could elect representatives who would pass "unfriendly legislation", which would further aid in the exclusion of slavery. This is known as the "Freeport Doctrine", but Douglas had stated it before the debates were arranged. It was not originated at Freeport nor in response to the question framed by Lincoln.<sup>32</sup> It was the logic of the situation created by the Dred Scott decision that framed the question and that caused Douglas to evolve an answer for his Illinois constituency.

Lincoln believed the question to be one of great significance, and pressed it on Douglas in order that the answer might be emphasized by repetition. He could hardly have expected any answer other than the one given. Neither does it seem possible that he could have believed that any answer given would produce much of a change in the sentiment of the South toward Douglas, knowing as he did that the stand of the latter on the Lecompton question had already destroyed his popularity in the slaveholding States. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the old tradition concerning the purpose of Lincoln in framing this question is erroneous, and that he prepared his question and pressed it home, because he believed that Douglas would meet it in such a manner as to increase the strength of the Buchanan Democrats, and yet be unable to satisfy the moderate anti-slavery elements who had not yet decided how to vote. Lincoln did not see that the "Freeport Doctrine" squared with the facts,

<sup>31</sup> *Complete Works*, I, p. 343. Opening speech at Jonesboro.

<sup>32</sup> James W. Sheahan, *The Life of Stephen A. Douglas* (New York, 1860), pp. 423-424, presents excerpts from a speech of Douglas at Bloomington, Illinois, on July 16, 1858, in which he made a clear statement of the doctrine later repeated at Freeport. Sheahan, *ibid.*, p. 422-423, presents a statement of the doctrine as set forth by Hon. James L. Orr of South Carolina in 1856, and the essential feature of the doctrine as expressed by Douglas in a speech at Springfield on June 12, 1857.



though southern leaders saw this clearly.<sup>33</sup> He ridiculed it and believed that he had demolished it with his arguments, and he must have believed that he had injured the chances of Douglas with the voters of Illinois in the contest then being waged.<sup>34</sup>

This question of Lincoln regarding the power of the people in a Territory to exclude slavery prior to the formation of a State constitution has been credited with the production of profound results. Time and again, it has been proclaimed that, by asking this question, Lincoln permitted Douglas to win the senatorship but compelled him to lose the presidency. Evidence to prove this important contention has never been furnished.

The fifth interrogatory which Lincoln presented at Jonesboro was of far greater significance to the South than the second Freeport question, though the latter has been regarded as so all-important. In his fifth question, Lincoln asked: "If the slaveholding citizens of a United States Territory should need and demand congressional legislation for the protection of their slave property in such a Territory, would you, as a member of Congress, vote for or against such legislation?"<sup>35</sup> This was the real and final question growing out of the Dred Scott Decision—the question to which the extremists of the South desired an answer. It was congressional protection for slavery in the Territories which became the chief demand of the outspoken southern leaders in Congress during 1859 and 1860, and the platform of the Southern Democratic party of 1860 declared it to be "the duty of the federal government, in all its departments, to protect, when necessary, the rights of persons and property in the territories, and wherever else its constitutional authority extends."<sup>36</sup>

Lincoln's fifth question evidently came to him as an after-thought, though he did hint that others might follow when he presented the first four at Freeport. He believed it to be worth the asking, but neither he nor Douglas seemed to attach much

<sup>33</sup> Cong. Globe, 35 cong., 2 sess., pp. 1242-1243. See for statements of Senator Albert G. Brown of Mississippi. Brown said: "I think I understand the position of the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Douglas), and I dissent from it. If I understand him, he thinks that a Territorial Legislature may by non-action or by unfriendly action, rightfully exclude slavery. I do not think so. But if territorial legislation is to be the end of legislation, he is right. If your doctrine of non-intervention shall be carried to the extent of allowing a Territorial Legislature by non-action or unfriendly action to annul a decision of the Supreme Court, then I say to the Senate and the world that the Senator from Illinois is right; by non-action, by unfriendly action within the limits of constitutional power, the Territorial Legislature can exclude slavery. But it is a question of power; not of right." The answer to this was what Douglas all along maintained: "You can not force slavery on an unwilling people." No antagonist, North or South, ever met the logic of this declaration.

<sup>34</sup> Complete Works, I, pp. 357-358. Reply at Jonesboro.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., pp. 359-360.

<sup>36</sup> Senator Brown of Mississippi declared: "We have a right of protection for our slave property in the Territories. The Constitution, as expounded by the Supreme Court, awards it. We demand it, and we mean to have it." Cong. Globe, 35 cong., 2 sess., p. 1243; Senator Jefferson Davis presented resolutions to the Senate on March 1, 1860, the fifth of the series reading: "Resolved, That if experience at any time should prove that the judiciary and executive authority do not possess means to insure adequate protection to constitutional rights in a Territory, and if the territorial government shall fail or refuse to provide the necessary remedies for the purpose, it will be the duty of Congress to supply the deficiency." Ibid., 36 cong., 1 sess., p. 395; Thomas H. McKee, The National Conventions of all Political Parties, 1789-1905 (Baltimore, 1906), pp. 110-111.

importance to it. Douglas answered it briefly by saying that it was "a fundamental article in the Democratic creed that there should be non-interference and non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the Territories." He followed this statement by a repetition of the "Freeport Doctrine," revealing in his remarks that he did not wish to reply unequivocally to this new question.<sup>37</sup>

It was this same question that Douglas answered before the Senate on February 23, 1859, when debating with Senator Brown of Mississippi. Then, the position of Douglas was made absolutely clear when he declared emphatically that he "would never vote for a slave code in the Territories."<sup>38</sup> This declaration followed a warning by Senator Brown that his State, supported, according to his belief, by a vast majority of the southern people, would demand that Congress protect slavery in the Territory of Kansas if protection were denied by the Territorial legislature.<sup>39</sup>

The answer of Douglas to another of Lincoln's Freeport questions was significant, for he stated frankly that since Congress had decided that Kansas had a sufficient population to become a slaveholding State, it had enough to become a free State.<sup>40</sup> The questions framed by Douglas and which Lincoln answered at Freeport were also significant, as were Lincoln's answers. The questions were so worded as to imply that Lincoln would, of course, give the answers of a radical. If Douglas really expected such a result, Lincoln's answers disillusioned him, for they were the answers of a very moderate Republican.<sup>41</sup> Had they been otherwise, the election would have turned more strongly in favor of Douglas. The only chance for Lincoln to win the contest was through the votes of men who were against slavery, but not ready to follow an extremist. Being cautious by nature, he was perfectly honest in maintaining a moderate position. His moderation turned out to be the basis of his statesmanship during the Civil War, since it enabled him to steer a safe and wise course between radicals and conservatives.

Had either of the contestants admitted that his rival was not what he wished the voters to believe him to be, it would have been an acknowledgement of a degree of failure. Nevertheless, we find Lincoln inadvertently revealing his honest opinion about Douglas and the South in a passage of his speech in the Galesburg debate: "I ask his attention also," he said, appealing to Douglas, "to the fact that by the rule of nationality he is himself fast becoming sectional. I ask his attention to the fact that his speeches would not go as current now south of the Ohio River

<sup>37</sup> *Complete Works*, I, pp. 367-369. Rejoinder of Douglas at Janeshoro.

<sup>38</sup> *Cong. Globe*, 35 Cong., 2 sess., p. 1244.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1242.

<sup>40</sup> *Complete Works*, I, pp. 314-315. Reply at Freeport.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 306-308. Opening speech at Freeport.



as they have <sup>15</sup> formerly gone  
there. I ask his attention to the  
fact that he felicitates himself to-day that all the Democrats of  
the free States are agreeing with him, while he omits to tell us  
that the Democrats of any slave State agree with him. If he has  
not thought of this, I commend to his consideration the evidence  
in his own declaration, on this day, of his becoming sectional  
too. I see it rapidly approaching. Whatever may be the re-  
sult of this ephemeral contest between Judge Douglas and myself,  
I see the day rapidly approaching when his pill of sectionalism  
which he has been thrusting down the throats of Republicans for  
years past, will be crowded down his own throat."<sup>42</sup>

In this utterance we do not have the statement of the party  
leader fencing for advantage, but the view of the man who for  
the moment had caught a vision of the real trend of events and  
who spoke out with no regard to consequences. Douglas must  
have seen the truth of Lincoln's statement plainly, but it did not  
suit his purpose to dwell much on the attitude which the South  
had assumed toward him. His great contention was that under  
the majority principle of popular sovereignty each section ought  
to feel that it would get a square deal in the Territories whether  
slavery should be voted up or down, while the application of the  
Wilmot Proviso principle, though bringing no practical gain to the  
North, would furnish the South with a reason for breaking up the  
Union. At no time during the canvass did Douglas openly ac-  
knowledge that he was unable to prove that Lincoln had become a  
radical, but it is absolutely certain that he understood the true  
position of his rival as well as his ability and worth. All of his  
important relations with Lincoln during the remainder of his  
career prove this. To a young Democratic reporter in Washing-  
ton, after his return to the capital following the campaign of  
1858, Douglas said: "Lincoln is a good man; in fact, a great  
man, and by far the ablest debater I have ever met."<sup>43</sup>

There was little change in the relations between the great  
rivals of Illinois in the interval between their senatorial and  
presidential contests. It was a period of much greater quiet in  
regard to the Territorial issue, but one in which the lack of har-  
mony between Douglas and the South increased. It was in this  
interval, as has been noted, that he declared so positively that he  
"would never vote for a slave code in the Territories by Con-  
gress." Not only this but he pointed out wherein lay the weak-  
ness of the Dred Scott Decision to the South, adding a new ele-  
ment of strength to the "Freeport Doctrine." Senator Brown of  
Mississippi speaking before the Senate on February 23, 1859,  
used the following language: "I have already said that the Con-  
stitution, unaided by legislation, gives us the right to protec-  
tion, but it does not give us the protection itself. It does not give  
us the power to punish those who trespass on our property,

<sup>42</sup> Complete Works, I, p. 440. Reply at Galesburg.

<sup>43</sup> Henry Watterson, "Marse Henry"; an Autobiography (New York, 1919), I, p. 79.

It does not give us the power to vindicate it in any manner, shape, or form. It gives us rights but they are naked rights: and until they are supported by legislation they amount to nothing but naked rights. Non-action goes a great way to exclude slave property from a Territory, further perhaps than to exclude any other species of property."<sup>44</sup> This statement should be read and pondered by every writer of American history who has ridiculed the "Freeport Doctrine", for as Douglas correctly asserted: "This is just what I said, and all that I said, and just what I meant by my Freeport speech in Illinois."<sup>45</sup>

In his debate with Senator Brown, Douglas also made the following comment on the Dred Scott Decision: "We agree that under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, slaves are property standing on an equal footing with all other property; and that consequently the owner of a slave has the same right to migrate to a Territory and carry his property with him as the owner of any other species of property has to move there, and carry his property with him. The right of transit to and from the Territories is the same for one species of property as it is for all others. Thus far the Senator from Mississippi and myself agree—that slave property in the Territories stands on an equal footing with every other species of property. Now the question arises to what extent is property, slaves included, subject to the law of the Territory. Whatever power the territorial legislature has over other species of property, extends in my judgment, to the same extent and in like manner to slave property. The Territorial legislature has the same power to legislate in respect to slaves that it has in regard to any other property to the same extent and no further."<sup>46</sup> If the Senator wishes to know what power it has over slaves in the Territories, I answer let him tell me what power it has to legislate over every other species of property, either by encouragement or by taxation, or in any other mode, and he has my answer in regard to slave property. But the Senator says that there is something peculiar in slave property, requiring further protection than other species of property. If so, it is the misfortune of those who own that species of property."<sup>47</sup>

It is not remarkable that the Democratic party divided in 1860. In reality the division was just as natural as was the rise of the Republican party. The South was entirely correct in repudiating Douglas, if the continuance of slavery in the States where it already existed demanded the extension of the institution in the Territories. If Lincoln was not in error in his belief

<sup>44</sup> Cong. Globe, 35 cong., 2 sess., p. 1243.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 1244.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p. 1244. The language used by Chief Justice Taney in his opinion regarding the power of Congress was that, "no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles property of that kind to less protection than property of any other description."

<sup>47</sup> Cong. Globe, 35 cong., 2 sess., p. 1244.



that the prohibition of slavery in the Territories would insure its "ultimate extinction," then those who believed in the perpetuation of slavery were not inconsistent when they resisted the territorial policies of both Lincoln and Douglas, since to remain passive could only mean an end of slavery in time.

The Republicans persisted in the advocacy of the Wilmot Proviso principle through the campaign of 1860, though they also sought to strengthen the party through the use of the home-stead policy and the protective tariff issue. There being nothing in the situation to demand acts of Congress prohibiting slavery in any existing Territories,<sup>48</sup> it is rather remarkable that the party continued to make headway with this issue. On the other hand, it must be remembered that most of the people of the North had earlier become convinced that slavery was wrong, that the South was on the aggressive,<sup>49</sup> and that there could be no injustice in confining the evil to the States where it was already established. These convictions had developed slowly, but the momentum of the movement had become so great before 1858 that it continued to gather strength through the years 1859 and 1860. In the South, the economic and social forces that had operated for many years to carry the people toward separate nationality were becoming more powerful and more difficult to resist. More and more of the leaders of that section were becoming convinced that a struggle for independence must come. It was difficult for Republican leaders to realize the danger. In fact they refused to believe that the South was in earnest, or that the advocates of secession could be sincere and honest men capable of supporting their convictions by heroic sacrifices if need be. In this respect Douglas showed a grasp of the situation far superior to that of Lincoln or other men of the North. No one excelled him in love for the Union, but he was not deceived concerning the South. He felt certain that the danger of disun-

<sup>48</sup> On March 3, 1858, Senator William H. Seward, catching a vision of what popular sovereignty meant under the conditions of the time, declared: "Popular sovereignty is an epic in two parts. Part the first presents freedom in Kansas lost. Part the second, if you will so consent to write it, shall be freedom in Kansas regained. It is on this ground that I hail the eminent Senator from Illinois and his associates, the distinguished Senator from Michigan, and the youthful, but most brave Senator from California. The late Mr. Clay told us that Providence has many ways of saving nations. God forbid that I should consent to see freedom wounded, because my own lead, or even my own agency in saving it should be rejected. I will cheerfully co-operate with these new defenders of this sacred cause in Kansas, and I will award them all due praise, when we shall have been successful, for their large share of merit in its deliverance." *Cong. Globe*, 35 cong., 1 sess., p. 943.

Thomas A. Nelson of Tennessee, said before the House on December 7, 1859: "I do think that we, or rather the two great parties of the land are fighting a battle altogether in advance of the time. To borrow the idea, though, I can not quote the language of that eminent and distinguished man, Mr. Webster, the question of slavery has been practically settled in regard to much the greater portion of this Union. It has been settled, as he in substance said by the laws of nature and the laws of climate. By the action of the people it has been settled since in regard to Kansas and Nebraska. It can not reasonably be expected to exist in Utah. The people of California have settled it for themselves. Where then are we to have this contest in regard to slavery? Why this agitation? If there is any portion of this wide land in regard to which the question of slavery can be appropriate, it must be Arizona; and I take it for granted it will be some years before Arizona will apply for admission into the Union." *Ibid.*, 36 cong., 1 sess., p. 47.

<sup>49</sup> See Chauncey S. Boucher, "In re That Aggressive Slavocracy", in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, June-September, 1921, pp. 13-79, for an able study challenging the view that the South was primarily the aggressive section.

ion was real, and after becoming convinced that Lincoln would be elected, he went South to try to stem the tide of southern nationalism. This was indeed an unusual action and one for which all men of North and South alike, should hold his name in reverence. One would like to know just what were the inner thoughts of Lincoln while Douglas traversed the South. It must be true that then, if not before, he saw that Stephen A. Douglas was a man of large stature. It must have been then, rather than later, that Lincoln began to see that whatever he should do about slavery he must do to save the Union. Though he gave no encouragement to any scheme of compromise, we have no mention in his inaugural address of the policy on which his party had been founded and to which it had clung tenaciously until secession had actually come. More than that, he developed his war policy along lines that gave no indication that he had ever been at variance with Douglas.

In 1850, the young Democratic Senator from Illinois had played no mean part alongside of Clay and Webster. Stirred by sectional speeches of colleagues from both North and South, he had voiced the spirit of nationalism of the old Northwest: "We have heard so much talk about North and South, as if these two sections were the only ones necessary to be taken into consideration, when gentlemen begin to mature their arguments for a dissolution of the Union, that I am gratified to find that there are those who appreciate there is a power in this nation greater than the North or the South—a growing, increasing, swelling power, that will be able to speak the law to this nation, and to execute the law as spoken. That power is the country known as the great West—the valley of the Mississippi, one and indivisible from the gulf to the Great Lakes, and stretching on the one side and the other, to the extreme sources of the Ohio and the Missouri—from the Alleghenies to the Rocky mountains. There, sir, is the hope of this nation—the resting place of the power that is not only to control but to save the Union. . . . This is the mission of the great Mississippi Valley, the heart and soul of the nation and the continent."<sup>50</sup>

It was impossible for Douglas to stem the tides of sectionalism that continued to rise in both North and South, but he labored at the task as long as there was any hope of success. On May 16, 1860, in a speech before the Senate, he uttered a warning in which he expressed a profound conviction. "Let this doctrine of intervention North and intervention South become the rallying point of the two great parties", he declared, "and you will find that you have two sectional parties divided by the line that separates the free from the slaveholding States. Whenever this shall become the doctrine of the two parties, you will find a southern intervention party for slavery and a northern intervention

<sup>50</sup> Cong. Globe, 31 cong., 1 sess., p. 365. In Senate, March 13, 1850.



party against slavery; and then will come the 'irrepressible conflict' of which we have heard so much."<sup>51</sup> Did the leader who gave voice to this keen interpretation of the situation show less wisdom than he who declared that "a house divided against itself can not stand" or than the statesman who proclaimed the struggle over slavery to be an "irrepressible conflict"?

Those who think that a new Douglas emerged to stand by Lincoln when the sword was drawn in 1861 are mistaken. He was no other than the clear-visioned young Senator of 1850, the statesman who more than any other of his time did whatever he did about slavery that the Union might be preserved. The Lincoln who came over to this position when the great crisis came was a far greater statesman than the Lincoln who had championed the Wilmot Proviso principle, unable to see that it was hastening the country toward disunion and war. The Lincoln who was able to pass through the war-hysteria of that bloody conflict so little influenced by its passion and hate, that he could conceive and carry out, in the States where it was possible, a generous policy of reconstruction in a spirit of "malice toward none" and "charity for all" had become more than a statesman—he had become a great man.

<sup>51</sup> *Cong. Globe*, 36 cong., 1 sess., appendix, p. 314.















